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proaches
David Schlangen
Modelling dialogue, that is, designing formal systems that reproduce aspects of natural conversation, is a challenging
task. In this overview paper we describe some of the challenges, and review extant approaches to dealing with them.
1 Introduction
Modelling dialogue, that is, designing formal systems that
reproduce aspects of natural conversation, is a challenging
task. Not only must a dialogue model be able to handle most
(if not all) of the linguistic phenomena that make monologi-
cal discourse hard to model (e.g., anaphora, presuppositions,
implicatures), there are also additional requirements: unlike
(written) text, dialogue unfolds in time, and timing matters;
and unlike monologue, a dialogue is an interaction, and is
shaped by the interests and capabilities of all dialogue par-
ticipants (DPs), while it unfolds.
Describing these challenges is one aim of this overview
paper; the other is reviewing some of the extant approaches
to adressing them in dialogue models. In the very general
sense of the term as used above, all dialogue systems, i.e.,
computer systems that interact via natural language with
users, are models of dialogue. Traditionally, however, the
term has been mostly employed for those modules within di-
alogue systems that handle what may be called content-flow
aspects of dialogue, organising the coherence of utterances
and cooperation on the task. Other, more interactional as-
pects such as the timing of utterances or cooperation on
the dialogue itself have been dealt with by other modules,
often in a less principled manner. As we argue, observable
interactions between these phenomena indicate that a better
strategy might be to combine models of these aspects.
This, then, is the structure of the paper: in Section 2 we
review some of the phenomena observable in human-human
dialogue that make it a challenging subject for study, such
as the organisiation of whose turn it is to speak, strategies
for recovery from communication problems, and regularities
in the “flow” of the dialogue. In Section 3 we review ap-
proaches that have been taken to modelling these phenom-
ena. We close with a brief discussion of shortcomings of
current models and implementations and possible ways to
overcome them.
2 Challenges
We take a descriptive stance in this section, simply describ-
ing some phenomena that can be observed in natural dia-
logue, proceeding from the smallest units, utterances, to the
overall organisation of dialogues. Whether they need to be
modelled or not is a decision that will be discussed in the
next section—models may choose to structure the interac-
tion in such a way that the occurence of some phenomena
can be avoided (e.g. by keeping strict control over the devel-
opement of the dialogue). Moreover, implemented models
may want to make a distinction between the range of phe-
nomena the model must be able to interpret and those it
must be able to generate; e.g., disfluencies (see below) will
likely occur in input from human users, but whether there is
any value in letting the model also produce them depends
on the purpose of the model.
2.1 Utterances
Spoken dialogue does not come pre-segmented into units in
the same way as written language does, where segmentation
is provided by typographic means. This opens the question
what the basic units of analysis are in spoken dialogue. The
notion of sentence or clause, as used in the analysis of written
monologue, can only be transferred with modifications, for
two reasons.
First, there are artefact of the spontaneous nature of
the language that are not normally present in written lan-
guage, and which render the products non-sentential. E.g.,
the string shown (together with some annotation) in (1) be-
low is not grammatical due to the abortion of one element
and a subsequent correction. Such artefacts are called dis-
fluencies or self-repairs, and seem to follow a fairly regular
pattern [26, 18], so that they can be relatively easily detected
and removed [16]. (1) is glossed with the names introduced
by [18, 30] for the different parts of self-repairs.
(1) until you’re | at the le-
start reparandum
|| I mean ||
editing terms
at the right-hand | edge of the quarry
alteration continuation
Second, turns in dialogue can be “shorter” than full sen-
tences, and consist for example just of nominal phrases, as
in (2)–B.
(2) A: Who came to the party?
B: Sandy.
Such sub-sentential utterances are called fragments, and are
related to elliptical sentences in that their form is, unlike that
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of disfluencies, not the result of “accidental” processes but
seems to be intended. Models of their contextual resolution
are provided by [13, 28], inter alia.
This is the first observation, then: the utterance as the
basic unit of analysis is not congruent with the syntactic no-
tion of sentencehood and needs to be given a disjunctive,
intention-oriented definition [1]: it can consist of a sentence
(possibly containing disfluencies), or smaller syntactic ele-
ments, as long as they form an intentional unit.
2.2 Dialogue Acts and Coherence
This brings us to the next observation. Utterances in dia-
logue are produced in order to achieve something, they can
be analysed as acts, just like other intentional behaviour.
The effects of these acts can be usefully bundled and labelled
with dialogue act types (a notion that generalises Searle’s
concept of speech acts [29]). Several such schemes have
been developed, of which we mention only DAMSL [2] here.
(3) gives an example of utterances annotated with DAMSL-
acts.
(3) A: Please open the door. [action-directive]
B: OK. [committ; accept; signal-und./acknowledge]
In DAMSL, a single utterance can be analysed as con-
stituting more than one act. This is an important feature,
because it allows a principled analysis of the various functions
an utterance can have. DAMSL distinguishes the forward-
looking function (FF), which is individuated with respect
to the way an utterance constrains future discourse (e.g., a
promise commits the promiser to intend the promised ac-
tion), and the backward-looking function (BF), which de-
scribes how the utterance relates to previous discourse.
This analysis integrates two important observations: One
is that there is a certain sense of “connectedness” to dis-
course, where new utterances relate to previous discourse.
Some explanatory theories of discourse (e.g., [15, 21, 8]) go
further than the descriptive DAMSL schema and take con-
nectedness of all utterances (coherence) to be a necessary
feature of “good” discourse. In any case, reproducing this
impression of coherence in discourse is a major task of all
dialogue models.
The second, related observation is that the choice of an
utterance constrains the future discourse. The FF in DAMSL
is meant only to record the effect of utterances on the public
beliefs and obligations of the utterer, but some researchers
have pointed out that there are regular patterns of utterance
types, and that in this sense an utterance more concretely
has an influence on further discourse. In the field of conver-
sation analysis for example ([25], [19] for a comprehensive
review), it has long been noted that for certain utterance
types (e.g., questions) there are preferred replies (e.g., an-
swers) and dispreferred replies (e.g., a refusal to answer),
the latter typically being more elaborate linguistically (e.g.,
specifying reasons). Dialogue models might chose to model
these patterns as well.1
1A question that will arise again is whether such patterns are
the result of other, for example intentional or politeness-related
Lastly, DAMSL also offers an additional dimension of
analysis, namely the information level at which an act oper-
ates, where the scheme distinguishes between acts that per-
tain to the task, to task-management, or to communication-
management. The observation that utterances can con-
tribute to organising the interaction of which they are part
will be further detailed in the next section.
To summarise: utterances in dialogue are intentional acts
that have to be interpreted with reference to the context they
occur in (backward-looking function) and the changes they
make to that context (forward-looking f.).
2.3 Interaction Management
In dialogue, participants take turn in speaking. This is nor-
mally accomplished very smoothly: overlaps of speech are
rare (less than 5% of turns in one study, see review in [19]),
and pauses between turns are short (often even shorter than
motor-planning the next utterance takes, see review of ev-
idence in [11]). Taking or handing over the floor seems to
be organised cooperatively between the DPs through the use
of certain turn-taking devices [24], such as using particular
intonational contours, producing certain dialogue acts that
“select” the next speaker (questions, requests), or making
visible signs that one wants to begin speaking—more on
models of turn-taking below in Section 3.3.
Controlling who gets the next turn via the devices men-
tioned above is one aspect of initiative in dialogue, which
[10] calls the dialogue initiative aspect. Task initiative, on
the other hand, is held by the dialogue participant “driving”
the task forward. These factors can vary independently; e.g.,
asking a clarification question gives you dialogue, but not
necessarily task initiative. There are dialogue genres where
initiative is regularly distributed unevenly between the DPs
(e.g., interviews, tutorials, exams), but in free conversation
it is normally held in equal measures by all DPs. Imple-
mented dialogue models might choose to restrict initiative
for technical reasons, however.
As [11] points out, there is a class of utterances that
seems to be systematically exempt from the preference to
minimise overlaps, the so-called feedback utterances (“uhu,
yeah”, etc.; [7]). To account for the function of such ut-
terances, [11] introduces the metaphor of parallel tracks on
which conversation proceeds, where one track is devoted to
the “official business” of the conversation, and the other
to managing the interaction; the observations about turn-
taking then can be restricted to utterances that contribute to
the main track. (This distinction has occured before above,
in the DAMSL information level and the distinction between
kinds of initiative.)
The particular aspect that feedback utterances man-
age is that of ensuring mutual understanding, a process
that [11] called grounding. Recipients in dialogue produce
these signals to indicate their success with understanding
the speaker’s contribution, and speakers appear to use them
constraints, or whether they should have an independent status
in a theory. Practical models, in any case, might simply chose to
directly produce these patterns rather than try to explain them.
to determine whether their communicative goals have been
reached.2 A sub-class of FBs that is particular prominent
in dialogue is that of clarification requests (CRs) as in (4).
They make understanding problems explicit and ask for repair
(other-repair compared to the self-repair discussed above).
(4) A: I saw Peter.
B: Peter? / Who? / You did what? / Pardon?
Given the frequency of CRs in human-human dialogue (4–5%
of utterances in task-oriented dialogue, [27] and references
therein) and the fact that implemented systems will likely
only have more understanding problems, modelling ground-
ing behaviour is an important part of modelling dialogue.
To summarise, besides having to ensure coherence of the
dialogue, the participants are also responsible for organising
their interaction—they cooperate on taking turns so as to
avoid ineffective overlaps, and on reaching mutual under-
standing on what was said.
2.4 Conversation Structure
Clarification requests as discussed above can be seen as
opening sub-dialogues that are “inserted” into the main
dialogue; similarly, sub-dialogues can concern corrections,
knowledge preconditions (“do you know what this is?”), etc.
At an even higher level of abstraction, one might want to
distinguish phases in conversations (a notion coming from
conversation analysis again, see [19, 11]), like openings,
main business, closings, with different conventions. Dialogue
models might use such phases to restrict the range of dia-
logue acts possible; but again the question arises whether
these phases have independent explanatory value or are re-
sults of other constraints.
3 Approaches
We now turn to the approaches to modelling dialogue. This
overview is organised into sections on models of what was
said (recognising dialogue acts), of what to say next, and of
when to say it. It closes with an overview of approaches to
combining such models.
3.1 Models of what was said
The first task here is to identify utterance boundaries and re-
move disfluencies. This is often factored out in implemented
models to the speech recognition component, and so will not
be further discussed here (see [16] for one approach).
We have said above that a useful abstraction of the in-
tentions connected with utterances is the concept of dialogue
acts. But how can the connection between an actual utter-
ance token and the dialogue act types it instantiates (i.e.,
the intentions they convey) be made? (If it is desired; not
2It is useful to distinguish layers of understanding here, e.g.,
acoustic, semantic, and pragmatic understanding, see [7, 11, 23,
27]; we gloss over this for reasons of space.
all dialogue models make it, in some the input directly de-
termines the reaction of the system—see next section.)
There are two general strategies that are used in practical
dialogue systems (which can be seen a complimentary and
whose results can be combined, [17]), using either symbolic
or statistic methods to evaluate cues in the input. The latter
work directly on surface information (words, lexical features,
prosodic information, etc.) and make their classification de-
cision based on probabilistic models induced from annotated
corpora (see for example [31]). Such models are robust, but
prone to miss subtle contextual nuances [6].
A common symbolic strategy is to use a two-stage ap-
proach, where a set of surface speech acts is computed
through syntactic and semantic analysis of the utterance,
among which the intended speech act is identified through
contextual reasoning (a textbook description of this method
is [5], different implementations are [6, 17]). In the context
of a travel information setting for example, such an approach
would derive for an utterance of “Can you tell me the direc-
tion?” the surface acts request and yes-no-question, among
which it would identify the request-reading, based on con-
textual reasoning, the extent of which varies between ap-
proaches.
A more principled symbolic model is offered by a the-
ory called SDRT [8], which uses a non-monotonic logic to
combine in a tractable manner information coming from var-
ious sources (including lexical and compositional semantics,
discourse structure, and cognitive states of DPs) and makes
detailed predictions about what makes dialogues coherent.
However, it has so far only been implemented for a carefully
restricted domain [28] and it is unclear whether it can be
used in large-scale models.
3.2 Models of what to say next
The models we discuss in this section can all be described as
specifying states and transitions between them; where they
differ is in what they assume the states are, i.e., which kind
of information they assume must be represented, and in how
the transitions are specified.3
3.2.1 Structured Dialogue Models
The first class of models we discuss has the most reduced
view of dialogue states. Among these approaches the old-
est are those that use finite-state automata to specify a set
of legal dialogues (for historical overview and references see
[22]). The states in these models are atomic, that is, they
carry information only in virtue of their position in the net-
work. The states are associated with topic-specific elements
such as prompts to be played (e.g. “where do you want to
fly to?”) and speech recognition grammars to load (e.g.,
specialised for city names). Transitions between states are
3This common framework for describing dialogue models was
proposed by the TRINDI consortium, who introduced the general
term information state update for it [33]. It is important to dis-
tinguish, as intended by the authors, this way of talking about
models from the particular models that were developed within the
TRINDI project (see below).
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triggered by specific events, such as recognition results (“To
Berlin.” vs. not-recognised, or, if they use the additional
abstraction, recognition of certain dialogue acts).
Such models impose a structure on the dialogue rather
than explain it; by keeping (both dialogue- and task-) initia-
tive to the system, they fully control the flow of the dialogue.
This has technical advantages because the search space for
interpretation is reduced, but also obvious disadvantages:
deviations from the pre-scripted path are not tolerated and
may result in unforeseen behaviour. Moreover, they make
no distinction between task and dialogue control, and so
recovery-mechanisms (as discussed under grounding above)
can not be specified abstractly but must be integrated into
the dialogue-script.
There are various attempts to make such approaches
more flexible (see e.g. [9, 12]), for example through allowing
information to be passed between states, making transitions
dependent on the execution of programs (raising the formal
complexity of the underlying automaton), or, more substan-
tially, through using forms as the structuring device, where
the dialogue is controlled by which information is missing in a
form (this allows overanswering of questions as in “To Berlin
on Monday” as an answer to the question above). The fact
that the task has to be pre-structured remains, however.
To summarise, the models sketched here mostly are jus-
tified on practical grounds (robustness). They are good
for pre-structured tasks such as constructing data-structures
(e.g., collecting information for a database lookup), and pro-
fessional development environments exists (see [22]). How-
ever, the feature that gives them their practical advantage—
the strict control over the dialogue—also makes them less
appropriate for more dynamic and self-organised tasks.
3.2.2 Plan-Based Dialogue Models
Plan- or agent-based models can be seen as being positioned
at the other end of the flexibility scale. In these models
the flow of the dialogue is based on local inferences over
rich contextual representations (recording beliefs, desires and
intentions of agents), and develops out of principles that are
seen to be general for intentional behaviour.
These approaches have been developed mostly within the
AI-commmunity, and started with attempts to connect the
notion of speech acts (see above) with AI planning concepts.
In one influential early system [4], responses as in (5) were
modelled.
(5) Patron: When does the Montreal train leave?
Clerk: At 3:15 at gate 7.
The system, in the role of the clerk, recognised the plan of
the customer (to go to Montreal, by train), and identified
possible obstacles (missing knowledge of time and place of
departure), which it adressed. This was an attempt to model
the inferences which seem to lie behind helpful (strictly
speaking, overinformative) behaviour as in the example. In
contrast to the approaches discussed in the previous section,
this response is not pre-scripted.
Because of their principled, declarative nature, such rule
systems are theoretically very appealing. However, the high
computational cost of the required reasoning made it nec-
essary already in the first systems to introduce task-specific
heuristics that restrict the search space, reducing the declar-
ativity of the models. Moreover, these early systems only had
available plans that concerned the domain level plan, which
made it difficult to deal with utterances that have interaction
management functions (see above). To adress these prob-
lems, [20] introduced a distinction between domain plans and
discourse plans, the latter handling for example clarification
sub-dialogues. (This distinction echoes that into “tracks”
discussed above.)
The still quite severe computational problems, however,
meant that such models were never employed in practical
systems, and for a while there was not much further devel-
opement. James Allen’s TRAINS/TRIPS research project
[6] then revived some of the central ideas while aiming to
maintain real-time behaviour through adding domain restric-
tions to the reasoning. It models sophisticated practical
problem solving, using concepts such as objectives (goals,
constraints), solutions (plans) and resources (for use in so-
lutions), which can become the topic of discussion, being
available for operations like evaluate, modify, repair and
abandon. These operations are described abstractly and are
only connected to respective domain operations by separate
rules, allowing for adaptation to different domains. Besides
tracking beliefs and intentions, the system also keeps note of
the grounding status of utterances (confirmed, unconfirmed,
to be clarified), and adds as a new theoretical concept obli-
gations that arise during the dialogue; this notion is used to
explain why people bother giving negative replies, which was
a problem for earlier plan-based approaches.
The resulting system is impressively flexible while also
being robust (see overview of evaluation in [22]); a possible
criticism is that applications appear to be rather resource-
intensive to build, and large-scale evaluations of attempts by
other groups to adapt the model to different domains have
still to be made.
3.2.3 Information-State Update: The QUD Model
To bring out the similarities and differences between
the models, we have used the general terminology of
information-states and transitions throughout this section.
The approaches developed under the label ISU, however, de-
fine information states more narrowly as records (typically
displayed as attribute-value structures) of the information
required by the model, and give transitions by defining up-
date rules that use this information to determine the new
state (i.e., to update it). Various models have been imple-
mented within this framework (see [33]); we describe Lars-
son’s QUD-model here.
The IS in this model distinguishes between information
that is deemed private to the system (e.g., its plans and
agenda) and such which is shared (i.e., has been grounded
between the DPs). The dialogue is structured around the
concept of the question under discussion (QUD) [14]. This
QUD might be something like “Where do you want to
travel?”; if the user replies “To Berlin, on Saturday”, the
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update rules remove this question from the QUD (“down-
date” it) and also search for a question on the plan that
matches the unused bit “on Saturday” and put it on the
QUD (accommodate it). While this is in effect not much
more powerful than forms-based models, the strength of this
approach lies in the declarative way in which this is formu-
lated, which for example allows grounding-behaviour to be
integrated. For this, domain-independent update rules look
at the quality of the input-recognition and track possible un-
derstanding problems, and control generic protocols to deal
with them (e.g., through generation of feedback or clarifica-
tion questions).
Independent from the details of the models implemented
within it, the ISU approach is attractive because it encour-
ages a declarative formulation of the required information
sources and the rules for computing transitions. The TRINDI
project also provides a toolkit for realising models in this
framework [33].
3.3 Models of when to say it
Most implemented dialogue systems use fairly strict turn-
taking models. TRAINS for example uses a push-to-talk
system, where taking and releasing the turn is explicitly an-
nounced. Most models based on structured-dialogue ap-
proaches also enforce strict turn-taking, allowing the user
only to react at pre-determined states. More advanced sys-
tems sometimes allow “barge in”, that is, allow users to
interrupt a system turn.
Natural turn-taking behaviour is more flexible than this,
as discussed above. The evidence cited there indicates that
a model of natural turn-taking must be projective rather
than reactive, that is, must be able to predict points where
turns might end before the actual event. [24] present such
a model, based on the notion of turn constructional units
and transition relevance points (TRPs). One cue they use to
project the position of TRPs is syntax (when is the utterance
likely to be completed?), other cues have been identified
as well (see [32] for a recent overview). At TRPs, either
the speaker selected to speak next (see above) is obliged to
react, or, if none was selected, the floor is open for anyone,
including the previous speaker. Models like this have been
implemented, interestingly mostly in the context of systems
that use modalities other than speech as well (e.g., user’s
gaze), see [32]. One problem holding back the use of such
models will be discussed in the next section.
3.4 Perspectives
In Section 2 we noted interactions between certain phenom-
ena, for example that certain utterance types (feedbacks)
underly different turn-taking constraints. In the previous
section, we noted that a natural turn-taking model must be
projective, that is, must determine whether a TRP is upcom-
ing while the utterance is processed. This means that a good
model of these phenomena must be incremental and parallel,
that is, must be able to decide on grounding and turn-taking
while it is still determining what was said, unlike traditional
systems which use a sequential processing strategy. Inter-
esting first steps have been taken in this direction [3], but
major research issues remain (e.g., incremental parsing, in-
cremental contextual reasoning, etc.) However, if progress is
to be made towards natural, flexible conversational systems,
then such models will be required.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have reviewed some phenomena found in
natural dialogue, and discussed extant approaches to mod-
elling essential parts of a full dialogue model, namely of what
was said, what to say next, and when to say it. What should
have become clear during the discussion is that there is “cor-
rect” approach—which one chooses will depend on the pur-
pose of the modelling. However, the constraints on models
that want to achieve natural-sounding dialogue should also
have become clear.
Due to the complexity of the subject, this review has
been rather cursory. Further information can be found in
the following monographs: [22], from a more practical per-
spective; [5] for the foundations of plan-based approaches;
and [11] for a comprehensive, non-computational model of
interaction. Current work at the interface between theoret-
ical and practical models of dialogue is presented mostly at
the workshop series of the special interest group on discourse
and dialogue (SIGdial) of the Association for Computational
Linguistics and at the “Semantics and Pragmatics of Dia-
logue” (SemDail) series.
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